

Cryptographic Hash Function

Elena Kirshanova

Course “Information and Network Security”

Lecture 6

12 апреля 2020 г.

Agenda

Last time:

- Achieve message integrity using MACs
- Construction of MACs from block ciphers. Example: CBC-MAC

Today:

Construct a more efficient MAC using **hash functions (HMAC)**

Cryptographic Hash Function: definition

A **Hash function** is a pair of polynomial time algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \mathcal{H})$:

1. Probabilistic $\text{Gen} : s \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
2. Deterministic $\mathcal{H}_s : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$.

Cryptographic Hash Function: definition

A **Hash function** is a pair of polynomial time algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \mathcal{H})$:

1. Probabilistic $\text{Gen} : s \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
2. Deterministic $\mathcal{H}_s : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$.

Most important property of \mathcal{H}_s is **collision resistant**:

Given s , there is no efficient adversary who can find two inputs $x, x' (x \neq x')$ to \mathcal{H}_s s.t.

$$\mathcal{H}_s(x) = \mathcal{H}_s(x')$$

! A “hash” function in general sense does not necessarily has this property. A **cryptographic** hash function must be collision resistant.

There are many collisions for \mathcal{H}_s , but it must be hard to find any.

Properties of cryptographic hash function

I Pre-image resistance (or one-wayness)

Given (s, y)

Find x s.t. $\mathcal{H}_s(x) = y$

A collision resistant hash function is also pre-image resistant

Properties of cryptographic hash function

I Pre-image resistance (or one-wayness)

Given (s, y)

Find x s.t. $\mathcal{H}_s(x) = y$

A collision resistant hash function is also pre-image resistant

II 2nd Pre-image resistance

Given (s, x)

Find $x' \neq x$ s.t. $\mathcal{H}_s(x) = \mathcal{H}_s(x')$

A collision resistant hash function is also 2nd pre-image resistant

Conclusion: Collision resistance is the strongest requirement

A word of caution: Exotic property of hash functions

In BitCoind world the above three properties: **pre-image resistance**, **2nd pre-image resistance**, **collision resistance** may have other names: **“hiding”**, **“puzzle friendliness”**, **collision resistance**.

These are not special properties! BitCoin uses standardized cryptographic hash function (wait until the end of the lecture).

See e.g. Section 1.1. in https://d28rh4a8wq0iu5.cloudfront.net/bitcointech/readings/princeton_bitcoin_book.pdf?a=1

Generic attack on any hash function: birthday paradox

Remainder: Let $h_1, h_2, \dots, h_n \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be independent identically distributed bit strings. Then Birthday paradox says that

$$\text{For } n = \mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{|\{0, 1\}^\ell|}\right) = \mathcal{O}\left(2^{\ell/2}\right) \quad \Pr[\exists(i \neq j) : h_i = h_j] > 1/2.$$

Generic attack on any hash function: birthday paradox

Remainder: Let $h_1, h_2, \dots, h_n \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be independent identically distributed bit strings. Then Birthday paradox says that

$$\text{For } n = \mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{|\{0, 1\}^\ell|}\right) = \mathcal{O}\left(2^{\ell/2}\right) \quad \Pr[\exists(i \neq j) : h_i = h_j] > 1/2.$$

Generic algorithm finds a collision in $\mathcal{O}(2^{\ell/2})$ hash evaluations:

1. Choose $2^{\ell/2}$ random bit strings (messages) $m_1, \dots, m_{2^{\ell/2}}$
2. For each m_i compute $h_i = \mathcal{H}_s(m_i)$, sort pairs to (h_i, m_i) w.r.t. h_i
3. Find in the sorted list $h_i = h_j$. A collision (m_i, m_j) .

Birthday paradox ensures that the above algorithm succeeds with constant success probability.

Conclusion: Require $\ell \geq 160$.

Real world hash functions: historical overview

1. 1980s: MD4 (Message Digest) by R. Rivest. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds

Real world hash functions: historical overview

1. 1980s: MD4 (Message Digest) by R. Rivest. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
2. 1990: MD5. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds

Real world hash functions: historical overview

1. 1980s: MD4 (Message Digest) by R. Rivest. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
2. 1990: MD5. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
3. 1995: SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) $\ell = 160$
Status: **Broken**. See <https://shattered.io/> for two PDFs with the same SHA-1 values.
Caution: may still be used by some systems (i.e., GIT).

Real world hash functions: historical overview

1. 1980s: MD4 (Message Digest) by R. Rivest. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
2. 1990: MD5. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
3. 1995: SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) $\ell = 160$
Status: **Broken**. See <https://shattered.io/> for two PDFs with the same SHA-1 values.
Caution: may still be used by some systems (i.e., GIT).
4. 2001: SHA-2 (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512). $\ell = 256, 384, 512$
Status: **Considered secure**

Real world hash functions: historical overview

1. 1980s: MD4 (Message Digest) by R. Rivest. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
2. 1990: MD5. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
3. 1995: SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) $\ell = 160$
Status: **Broken**. See <https://shattered.io/> for two PDFs with the same SHA-1 values.
Caution: may still be used by some systems (i.e., GIT).
4. 2001: SHA-2 (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512). $\ell = 256, 384, 512$
Status: **Considered secure**
5. 2012: SHA-3 (Keccak). SHA-3 – 224/256/384/512.
Status: **Considered secure**

Real world hash functions: historical overview

1. 1980s: MD4 (Message Digest) by R. Rivest. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
2. 1990: MD5. $\ell = 128$
Status: **Broken**. A collision can be found within seconds
3. 1995: SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) $\ell = 160$
Status: **Broken**. See <https://shattered.io/> for two PDFs with the same SHA-1 values.
Caution: may still be used by some systems (i.e., GIT).
4. 2001: SHA-2 (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512). $\ell = 256, 384, 512$
Status: **Considered secure**
5. 2012: SHA-3 (Keccak). SHA-3 – 224/256/384/512.
Status: **Considered secure**

In Russia

1. GOST R 34.11-94 and GOST 34.311-95. $\ell = 256$
Status: **Deprecated** Collision in 2^{105} time
2. GOST R 34.11-2012. Streebog $\ell = 256, 512$
Status: **Should be used in certified products**


Construction of a hash function: Merkle-Damgård paradigm

Given a compression function (will be defined later)

$$h : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$$

Construct $\mathcal{H} : \mathcal{M}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$


Let $m = (m_1, m_2, m_3)$ of arbitrary length.



IV - Initial Value (fixed for given hash function)

PB - Padding Block $[100 \dots 0 || \text{mes. length}]$. If **PB** does not fit add another block

Security of Merkle-Damgård construction




Theorem: If h is collision resistant so is H .

Construction of compressing function h

$\text{Enc} : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ – a block-cipher.

Davies-Meyer construction:


$$h(H_i, m) = \text{Enc}(H_i, m) \oplus H_i$$



Theorem (Informal): If Enc is a “good” cipher (i.e., Enc is a random permutation for fixed $k \in \mathcal{K}$), then finding a collision $h(H, m) = h(H', m')$ takes $2^{n/2}$ evaluations of (Enc, Dec) .

Example: SHA-256

In SHA-256 the compression function is:



Merkle-Damgård construction is used to allow for arbitrary message length.

Alternative construction of h

Davies-Meyer construction:

$$h(H, m) = \text{Enc}(H, m) \oplus H$$

Miyaguchi-Preneel construction:

$$h(H, m) = \text{Enc}(H, m) \oplus H \oplus m$$


Other variants of combinations of Enc , H , m exist. Not all combinations are secure!

GOST P 34.11-2012 (Streebog) uses Miyaguchi-Preneel.

Sponge construction: SHA-3

SHA-3 (Keccak) is not based on compression function. It is a **Sponge** (рус. Губка) construction.

P_0, \dots, P_{n-1} are derived from the input message. Z_0, Z_1, \dots is the output



The block transformation f is a permutation consisting of 5 primitive function (small permutations, bitwise operations).

Hash functions in BitCoin


Basic concept in BitCoin: **Proof of Work (PoW)**

Intuition: if a user has computing power \implies he should be able to prove it via doing some work

- PoW introduced to crypto by Dwork & Naor (1992) as a countermeasure against spam
- **Idea:** force users to solve some “moderately hard” puzzle (a solution should be fast to verify)

Hash functions in BitCoin: constructing PoW

Main primitive: cryptographic hash function $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$
that takes $T(\mathcal{H})$ time to evaluate



For a cryptographic hash function \mathcal{H} Alice cannot do better than brute-force over s . This is a pre-image search.